The Intolerance of Diversity in Psychoanalytic Institutes

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In an account of her experience surveying different training methods in European institutes, Ann-Marie Sandler (1990) noted her shock at discovering her own prejudices: "I found myself wanting to deride those methods which were different from those I was accustomed to, and it took some time to overcome my culture shock and to accept, at an emotional level, the reality that there were outstanding analysts who have followed a different training route." (p.49) She was led to this confrontation with herself by the task she had undertaken, to survey different approaches to training, and by the sponsor of the task, the IPA; as a member of the British Psychoanalytical Society, she might have been expected to provoke some skepticism had she found the British system of training the only fully adequate one. Most analysts, however, find little reason to confront their prejudices. The historical corollary of this intolerance is the remarkable history of schisms in psychoanalytic institutes, testifying to the difficulty of containing much less accepting theoretical differences within existing organizations.

It might be worthwhile at the start to remind ourselves of the extent of this schismatic tendency in the institutional history of psychoanalysis -- quite apart from the more familiar history of personal "defections," the stories of Freud's ruptures with Adler, Stekel, Jung, Rank, and Ferenczi. In the 1940's in New York, two groups split off from the New York Psychoanalytic Society (see Frosch, 1990; Eckhardt, 1978). One group calling itself the Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis suffered two schisms in turn; one group defected to form the William Alanson White Institute and a second to form the Comprehensive Course in Psychoanalysis at the New York Medical College. The second group splitting off from the New York Psychoanalytic Society formed the Columbia Institute. At virtually the same time, the British Psychoanalytical Society narrowly averted a split by agreeing to form into virtually autonomous Kleinian and Freudian sub-groups; subsequently a third or "Middle Group" separated out. In European institutes, schisms have occurred in Germany, Austria, France, Sweden, and Norway (Eckhardt, 1978) In France, the controversies surrounding Lacan produced at least four surviving institutes: The Freudian School, The Fourth Group, the Paris Institute and the French Psychoanalytic Association (Turkle, 1978). Gitelson (1983), in addition, notes schisms that have occurred in Spain, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela, as
well as, in this country, in Washington/Baltimore, Philadelphia, Boston, Cleveland, and Los Angeles. Arlow (1972) refers to half a dozen splits in the American Psychoanalytic Association, as many narrowly averted splits, and adds to the census of splits in the International Psychoanalytic Association, Columbia and Australia.

Alongside the sketchy data about such splits, there is very little public description of them. A notable recent exception has been the publication of the documents surrounding the "controversial discussions" in the British Psychoanalytical Society (King & Steiner, 1991). In a rare officially published glimpse behind the scenes, Fleming (1976, p. 911) wrote of the conflict that irrupted in the Los Angeles Institute, describing "the unrelenting hostility and distrust among various groups and individuals, whatever their theoretical orientation" and adding, with some bewilderment: "There was no single discernible basis for the presence of so much bad feeling." Henry Murray, of the Boston Psychoanalytic Institute, is reported to have commented on "an atmosphere too charged with humorless hostility . . . . an assemblage of cultists, rigid in thought, armored against new ideas, and (in the case of 2 or 3) ruthlessly rivalrous for power" (Fine, 1979, p. 137).

Nor are schisms within institutes the only symptoms of this tendency: The International Psychoanalytic Association arrived at a standoff with the American Psychoanalytic Association in 1938 over the issue of lay analysis (Oberndorf, 1953). The Academy of Psychoanalysis was formed in opposition to the American Psychoanalytic Association (Millett, 1962). Division 39 of the American Psychological Association is torn by conflict between Sections I and V (Meisels, 1990).

This does not take into account the more hidden history of factionalism and intellectual intimidation that besets institutional life. The official histories tend to be self congratulatory and blandly free of reference to ingrained conflict (see, for example, Pollock, 1976; Morris, 1992). But there are repeated references in the literature on training to the problems of excessive orthodoxy, idealization, and intimidation, at least in the lives of candidates (see Balint, 1948, 1954; Bibring, 1954; Thompson, 1958; Greenacre, 1966; Widlocher, 1978; Orgel, 1978, 1990; Hinshelwood, 1985; Kernberg, 1986; Steltzer, 1986; King & Steiner, 1991) -- references that echo all too readily with one's personal experience of the field. And there are frequent references, as well, to "heretical" leaders (see, for example, Frattaroli, 1992).

Why is this so? Typically, such conflicts are attributed to ambitious or narcissistic personalities. But while the role of such personalities is no doubt significant, such an explanation fails to account for the power they
are able to mobilize among the members of analytic institutes and for the ubiquity of the problem. A more sophisticated version of such an explanation argues that such schisms are part of the analytic tradition, originating in Freud's anxiety over his succession (Roustang, 1982; Levinson, 1991). But I believe that the dynamic answers to this question have to be sought in an understanding of the anxieties aroused by the ongoing collective professional activities of psychoanalysts. That is, whatever Freud's ambitions and motivations may have been, and however much he may have put his stamp upon the psychoanalytic movement, the study of his particular conflicts cannot adequately account for why ongoing institutions, 50 years after his death, are still beset by rancorous and destructive conflicts about fundamental "beliefs." I do not believe Freud's contribution to the problem is irrelevant, by any means, as I will try to show; but it has to be situated in the context of on-going institutional life.

As Jaques (1955) and Menzies (1967) have pointed out, building on the pioneering work of Bion on groups (1959), organizations not only provide opportunities to work collectively, they also provide "social defences," ways in which the anxieties of members are collusively and imperceptibly addressed. My argument in this paper is that intolerance of diverse points of view in psychoanalytic institutes -- an intolerance that ranges from automatic dismissal of differences on the one hand to schismatic annihilation on the other -- is a social defense. If we look at the anxieties aroused by the nature of the work psychoanalysts are engaged in and by the work relations they enter into, we can begin to tease apart the beliefs and behaviors that are task related from those that are more purely defensive and end up undermining task performance.

I do not think there can be much disagreement about the dysfunctional nature of this intolerance for intellectual differences in analytic institutes: it strikes at the heart of whatever claims analysts may make for being scientific observers of human behavior or serious clinical practitioners. It is a defence, then, but against what anxieties?

There are three sets of answers to this question, I believe, three areas of conflict that feed into and mutually reinforce this social defence of intolerance. One has to do with the nature of analytic work: the anxieties analysts encounter in the course of their work that lead them to feel the need to know with certainty what they believe. A second has to with the particular nature of the analytic organization and community: because, by and large, analysts work outside and quasi-independently of the organizations to which they belong, yet within strong systems of lineage, their membership in those organizations arouses particular
ambiguities and anxieties. The third area of conflict has to do with what we could call the culture of psychoanalysis, deeply ingrained attitudes and assumptions about the value and meaning of psychoanalysis and its relationship to the world. Each of these areas of conflict is in itself complex and contains multiple aspects. Moreover, they intersect with and reinforce each other. Taken together, I believe, they account for the profound persistence of this disabling symptom.

The Nature of the Work.

Psychoanalysts practice alone, without the assistance or corroboration of colleagues. To be sure, they engage continually in relationships with their patients, but in those relationships they have the unique responsibility to maintain the professional boundaries of the relationship, often in the face of pressure from patients, and to represent the task of inquiry and understanding. Participants as they are, they are also always observers and managers.

In addition, analysts are subject to continual assaults on their emotional lives, assaults to which they must learn to remain open to experiencing and understanding because the instruments with which they work are parts of themselves: their empathy, their countertransference, their understanding (Buechler, 1992). They cannot reduce their patients to symptomatic signs or diseased organs. Their work recalls to them how much is at stake in the lives of their patients. Nor can they work with the expectation of gratitude. As Anna Freud (1966) put it, the personality of the analyst is continually at risk.

Moreover, the phenomena they engage are complex and obscure. Perhaps more than any other professional, psychoanalysts must cultivate an exceptional degree of tolerance for ambiguity. Unable to rest content with their diagnoses, they must continually be willing to notice the fleeting evidence of what both they and their patients are wishing to elude. Nor can they be certain when their work has been successful, even when they feel gratified. It is little wonder that analysts as a professional group are prone to depression (Dreyfus, 1978) or "burnout" (Cooper, 1986).

Under those conditions of isolation, uncertainty and stress, analysts turn to their theories. As Friedman (1988) has sympathetically and cogently demonstrated: "stress and theory go hand in hand. . . . There are many ways that a therapist can be thrown off balance, and every time that happens, some aspect of theory will be important to him." (pp. 89-90) Moreover, in the isolation of the consulting room, particular theories or
beliefs provide lifelines, so to speak, back to the psychoanalysts’ own analysts, supervisors and teachers, linking him to a community of like-minded practitioners.

That link through his theory to the community that trained and supervised him helps to reinforce and sustain the analyst in his isolated and anxiety ridden work. Every theory he turns to -- either because it feels reliable and true or because it seems indispensable or required -- came from his experience with a supervisor, teacher or analyst. It is what he has internalized from his training. Thus the analyst’s theory serves a dual purpose: it is an indispensable set of tools that helps him to maintain his balance in his work, as Friedman points out, and it is also an aspect of his analytic identity. The point here is that the balancing act Friedman (1988) so respectfully and appreciatively describes is profoundly affected by the flexibility and openness of the analyst's identity, and that in turn affects and is affected by the larger community with which the analyst finds his professional identification.

Schafer (1979) has spoken warmly of this aspect of analytic life, of the value of the ‘many ties to people who have been central to [our] training. . . . All these people and experiences exert a kind of imprinting effect . . . constituted of feelings of gratitude, loyalty, identification, gratification, and idealization.” (p. 350) While such comments are not at all uncommon in the on-going activities of institutes, at anniversary celebrations, promotion and book parties, festschriften and graduation ceremonies (the occasion that prompted Schafer's comments), they are rarely found in print. Far more frequently these same feelings are identified in the literature on training as dangerous signs of incomplete analysis, especially dangerous in the training analysis. Idealizing is usually seen as a defense against hostility, loyalty as an aspect of resistance or factionalism, gratification as a form of bribery, etc. At the extreme such unanalysed feelings can lead to a sense of inauthenticity or, even, fraudulence.

This is not a mere matter of hypocrisy. On the one hand analyst’s, like others, value the support and encouragement they receive from their teachers and trainers (when they don’t feel criticized or persecuted), feel gratitude and loyalty (when they are not resentful or competitive), and are often willing to forgive the short comings of their elders (when not scornful) -- if they do not elevate them into virtues. On the other hand, they know the dangers. "It took me a good 10 years of full-time psychoanalytic practice to feel myself a psychoanalyst and to be able to accept patients without some degree of anxiety and guilt;" wrote Klauber (1983), "and I know I am not alone in this." The new analyst, he added, "turns to his identification with his analyst and, beyond him, with Freud.
Or rather to the analyst who functions partly by means of a creative identification, and partly as an introject, so that he may find himself on occasion repeating irrelevant interpretations to his patients 20 years later. For many years the younger psychoanalyst functions -- or at any rate I functioned -- in part with an analytical false self . . . with an analytical false self struggling with a dying language." (p. 46)

Though many analysts might wish to shrug off such a statement by attributing Klauber's "problem" to a poor training analysis, his candor speaks to a real problem in the process by which an analyst's identity is formed and sustained: identifications with analysts and supervisors, introjections, feelings of loyalty and gratitude, idealizations -- all help to sustain the analyst in the anxiety of his lonely work. They are defensive, to be sure, but they are also part of who he is and what he needs to remind himself he believes as he works. Only gradually is an analytic identity formed that feels comfortable and true (King, 1983; Buechler, 1988).

This duality defines a contradiction imbedded in the use of psychoanalytic theory: on the one hand, it serves the purpose of guiding the analyst's relationship with his patient, helping him to maintain his balance; on the other, it serves to sustain his relationship with his colleagues through the medium of his analytic identity. And that identity, in turn, as Ellenberger (1970) has pointed out, is linked to a "school" in the sense of the ancient Greco-Roman philosophical schools. Analysts are Freudian or Kleinian or Sullivanian, etc. in much the same way that ancient philosophers were Epicurean or Stoic or Pythagorian. Internalizing their training as part of their identities, their very mode of thinking is a reflection of their distinctive points of view as members of particular schools.

Such schools cut across the boundaries of most institutes, however, and result in sub-groupings or factions to which members turn to find support or confirmation of their analytic identities. Moreover, other differences in orientation and technique, less identifiable to the outside world as an analytic school, develop within institutes; indeed, such development often usefully facilitates differentiation and stimulates dialogue. But as King (1983, p. 189) has pointed out, the risk is ever present that analysts may find a "pseudoidentity" via such sub-groups: "If they are unable to feel 'I am a psychoanalyst who has done this on my own' at least they can say 'I am an analyst who belongs to this group.'” (See also Bollas, 1993.) And to the extent that analytic identities are vulnerable -- either because of internal crises, external threats or because they have never been firmly established -- the potential exists for factions to form that become increasingly rigid, intolerant of compromise, and
dependant upon having the negative attributes that define their difference located in another faction.

This is a situation that is inevitable, I believe, when identity is so closely linked to work and so much at risk because of the nature of the work. One finds similar dynamics -- and often comparable virulence -- in academic life. But for analysts this situation is particularly troubling because it threatens to expose a contradiction at the heart of their work and their identity: it potentially undermines the confidence they have in the impartiality and "objectivity" of their response to their patients. Reviewing the "Controversial Discussions" in the British Psychoanalytical Society during 1941-1943 (King & Steiner, 1991, passim), for example, one is struck by how the participants on all sides stressed repeatedly the "scientific" nature of the issues and their professional role as "scientists." The use of "science" by them in support of their professional identities reflects the positivistic bias of the time, of course, as well as their allegiance to Freud. But the important point, I believe, is that they did not want to think of themselves as limited in their response to the clinical data by political issues.

What is really threatening to the professional identities of analysts is not that they are not scientists but that their analytic beliefs may prevent them from being fully responsive to the material presented by their patients. The issue is comparable to the one posed by countertransference: an unexamined bias on the part of the analyst that distorts and limits his capacity to respond fully to his patient. Analysts may joke about how the patients of Freudians turn out to have Freudian problems or Jungian analysts produce Jungian patients, and so on. But it is not a joke for the analyst who is struggling to grasp and make sense of deeply disturbing and painful clinical material to think that his allegiance to the analytic concepts of his particular school limits his awareness of his patient. Nor is it a joke to the analyst who tries to explain his work to the larger world.

We can see now more clearly how much is at stake for the analyst in believing his theories are fully adequate and true to the clinical data and, therefore, why he might well want to join in the social defense offered by his "school" or his faction of identifying competing theories as misleading or inadequate, and in doing so not even be able to grant them the status of reasonable alternatives. To the extent that he sustains the belief that the theories he and his particular colleagues are using in their work are more "true" or less "false" than those guiding others -- more powerful, less defective or dangerously misleading, more recognized, less suspect, etc. -- he has less cause for the always threatening anxieties of self-doubt, incompetence and failure.
Each analyst's reliance upon and contribution to the social defense of intolerance varies in response to a variety of factors such as his own insecurity or his loyalty to his analytic fathers. I doubt that without the other factors we have yet to explore that sustain the defense it would exist as powerfully as it does. But the defense is securely present and readily available to help stabilize him in his lonely and difficult work.

The Nature of Membership

A second set of answers has to do with the analyst's need to secure a place in the network of his colleagues. Some of this is obvious. For opportunities to supervise and teach, for referrals, for continuing professional self-esteem as well as financial security, analysts are dependent upon maintaining their standing in their professional communities. Public deviance from established practices and beliefs is risky. During training, obviously, candidates are closely scrutinized and evaluated; after becoming full-fledged analysts, this scrutiny becomes more subtle but no less important as selections are made to key teaching, supervisory and administrative roles.

These are crucial factors in the life of any professional community, and it is easy to see how the existence of factions influencing such decisions and altering the balance of power will arouse the most powerful anxieties and stimulate the most extreme defenses. In examining the history of the split in the British Psychoanalytical Society, for example, it seems clear that the immediate stimulus for the crisis was the retirement of Ernest Jones from the presidency after years in which he had carefully balanced opposing factions; his successor, Glover, who was a virulent anti-Kleinian, threatened the existing pattern of assignments of candidates to training and supervising analysts, referrals, and promotions. (King, 1991)

But in order to understand how such issues of power can become particularly explosive in analytic institutes, we need to explore what are, in effect, structural weaknesses peculiar to such organizations, weaknesses that derive, I believe, from the kind and quality of belonging that members experience.

To begin with, there is a well known and much discussed contradiction embedded in the very notion of analytic training as it is currently understood. From the 1920's, the training analysis has been viewed as the core requisite for analytic candidates (Balint, 1948) -- and for very good reason. The discovery of transference and with it, of course,
countertransference imposed an inescapable demand for training. But then the training analysis takes on a dual function. On the one hand, of course, it is simply an analysis. On the other hand, it is the analyst's passport to acceptance and certification, his means of proving himself ready and adequate to the task of analyzing others.

Until recently, it was accepted practice for training analysts to report to training committees on the progress of their analysands in training, despite a widespread uneasy sense that the practice compromised the analysis (Lifschutz, 1976; Wallerstein, 1978). Even in institutes that officially proscribe such communication, in an attempt to protect the integrity of the candidate's analysis, it has been demonstrated that compromising communication takes place through unofficial channels (Dulchin, 1982a, 1982b). It is a commonplace in the history of psychoanalysis to read reports of analysts who are told that their differences and disagreements with colleagues are signs they require further analysis. The point here is that analysts are always vulnerable in the eyes of their colleagues to the most intimate ad hominem arguments. Even their own analyses, in a sense, are not available to them as a free explorations of their own dynamic conflicts.

Interestingly Freud (1921) himself adumbrated the potential of this issue in his discussion of group psychology. Arguing that groups are held together primarily by two factors in addition to libidinal bonds -- a common object or leader who replaces the ego ideal of individual members and the indentification of members with each other, an identification originating in their common allegiance to the leader -- he stressed the essentially conservative and conforming nature of group life. Individual psychoanalysis in fostering a developmental process of differentiating ego and ego ideal as well as ego and object would work to dissolve such bonds. Establishing and sustaining a group, on the other hand, would require creating and reinforcing such bonds.

Glover (1943), in the midst of the controversial discussions of the British Psychoanalytical Society, pointed out that the candidate in training "has little opportunity of emancipating himself from the transference situation . . . . The analysis may stop but the Candidate remains in an extended or displaced analytic situation." For him, this was a sign that the training system had broken down. Balint (1948), surviving those same discussions, described his experience of candidates' "submissiveness to dogmatic and authoritative treatment without much protest and too respectful behavior." (p. 167) He attributed this to the tendency of candidates to introject their analysts into their super-egos with a consequent weakening of the ego -- the group process Freud (1921) had described -- a tendency which he saw fostered by the training system.
Thompson (1958), speaking of her experience at the White Institute and using a different theoretical orientation, makes virtually the same point about the effect of the on-going "incestuous" power relationships between candidates and their analysts: "More than any other analytic patient, the candidate is faced with realistic difficulty in resolving his infantile dependency." (p. 49) Arlow (1972, p. 561) noted that "psychoanalytic training often comes to be experienced as a prolonged initiation rite." He added that anxiety propels the candidate into identifying with the aggressor; he "remodels" himself in the image of his community's ideal (p. 562). More recently, Kernberg (1986) pointed to the containment of the transferential "radioactivity" that is a by-product of analytic training: the multifaceted or "incestuous" nature of relationships in training institutes promotes a splitting process. Candidates and graduates preserve the idealization of their own analysts by joining the social defence of projecting deviance and "error" elsewhere into other institutes or schools. Thus they maintain not only a sense of personal security but also sustain their common belief in the privileged position of their own group.

Lacan took this point to its ultimate conclusion (Turkle, 1978): "What does it mean to have an organization of psychoanalysts and the certificate it confers -- if not to indicate to whom one can go to find someone who will play the role of this subject who is presumed to know?" For him the training implications that followed from this required the "self-authorization" of the analyst. In essence, he argued, each analyst had to determine for himself -- as Freud did -- if and when he was to become an analyst at all.

Lacan's uncompromising logic does help us to see in its clearest form the contradictions that lie at the heart of analytic training: What is the purpose of the training analysis, therapy or certification? And what is the reason for analytic authority, empowerment or control? All of those cited above who have wrestled with these contradictions -- Balint, Glover, Thompson, Arlow, Kernberg -- in one way or another have attempted to suggest ways of ameliorating the tensions this gives rise to.

The issue is, on the one hand, about the integrity of the analysis: is it for the candidate's personal benefit? or is it his ticket of admission into the profession? The deeper side of this issue is about the link between the candidate and his analyst: how fully is the candidate tied to his analyst? Is the potential for idealization and gratitude inherent in this relationship subversive of the analysis? Does it, in other words, tend to insure the dominance and control of the old guard at the expense of the analytic freedom of the candidates. This is the point that has been most
frequently stressed in the literature. But there is another side to this that -- to my knowledge -- has never been noted: the threat posed to the institute by the intensity of the idealized relationships between the pairs of analysts and candidates. Can an organization which is composed essentially of intense pairing relationships not feel threatened by those pairs?

Bion (1959) made an observation about the particular significance of the pair in psychoanalysis that suggests how intractable the problem is for psychoanalysis. Noting that the emphasis upon sexuality in psychoanalysis corresponds to the "basic assumption" of pairing and the projection onto the pair of the group's sexual fantasies, he observed: "the individual cannot help being a member of a group even if his membership of it consists in behaving in such a way as to give reality to the idea that he does not belong to a group at all. In this respect the psychoanalytical situation is not 'individual psychology' but 'pair'." (p. 131)

Psychoanalysis, of course, is based upon the pair, and psychoanalytic training in its most prominent features takes place in pairs: the pair of the candidate and his analyst, the pairs of the candidate and his individual supervisors, and the pairs of the candidate with his control or training cases. To be sure, there are classes and meetings of the training committees, etc. But I think there is little doubt in the minds of most psychoanalysts that psychoanalysis is fundamentally about the encounter that takes place between two people. If we add to this the fact that in the overwhelming number of instances those encounters take place in the private consulting rooms of analysts and supervisors, not in the physical space of institutes, and that the financial arrangements for analysis and supervision are negotiated by the pair, though there may be institutional rules governing fees in some cases, we have a situation where it is all too easy to deny that the enterprise of psychoanalysis is a collective or group enterprise. Indeed, most institutes are part-time affairs, seldom paying their key officials anything close to a living wage.

The institutional consequences of the fact that psychoanalysts for the most part do not consider themselves located within their institutions when they conduct their most essential work are, I think, profound. The institution tends to become, in the minds of its members, sets of particular relationships and affiliations, not an enterprise in itself. Add to this the stress on lineage in psychoanalytic training, not merely the link to one's own analyst but to one's analyst's analyst, etc., a linking that can transcend institutional boundaries, we can begin to see how the lack of firm institutional boundaries around work can lead to ambiguity and institutional conflict. Latent conflicts, negative transferences, potential
perceptions undermining idealizations or narcissistic distortions -- all the psychological "radioactivity," in Kernberg's term, affecting the multiple pairing relationships of psychoanalysis -- finds fertile ground outside the pairs, within the loosely containing institution and, even better, within other institutions yet more remote.

The effect upon institutes of these powerful centrifugal forces, paradoxically, I believe, has been the creation of massively "overbounded" (Alderfer, 1980) organizational systems, systems with excessively impermeable boundaries, rigid hierarchies, and inflexible role and task assignments. Institutes show all the typical signs of such "overbounded" systems; they have strict and restrictive admissions criteria; they typically exhibit rigid hierarchical structures leading to tightly controlled decision making processes; they insist on ideological purity, resist change, etc. "'Overbounded' systems show less boundary permeability than is optimal for the system's relationship with its environment," Alderfer points out, and they face the threat of losing their capacity to respond to environmental changes. They tend to show unequivocal and uncompromising clarity about their goals, to exhibit highly centralized and monolithic authority relations, to restrict the free flow of information and inhibit criticism. "In overbounded systems people feel confined, constrained and restricted. Incumbents experience lack of creativity and stimulation, especially at lower levels in the organization where the full force of the organizational structure affects the individual" (p. 272) Such systems, he adds, often show a typically positive balance of feelings, so long as survival is not threatened. But this is "partially the result of repressive forces within the system. The effect of a monolithic authority structure mutes . . . criticism and tends to direct negative affect outward rather than inward." (p. 274) Along somewhat similar lines, Rustin (1985) has applied Simmel's critique of secret societies to psychoanalytic institutions.

The description of the overbounded system is also consistent with the historic myths of psychoanalysis as a beleaguered and socially subversive movement. An organization that is established in opposition to established social values and that faces relentless hostility without and defection within has to develop strong and impermeable boundaries. It must defend itself at all costs; it's very survival seems continually at stake.

But, I believe, the real danger against which the overbounded analytic systems are defending is not external or objective. It is the psychological power of the pair. The systems have to be rigid, confining and authoritarian because the primary allegiances of its members are to the
psychoanalytic pairs of which they are a part and to the lineages, the
interlocking chains of pairs, of which they are descendants.

This is not to say that these pairs are, in fact, more real or more defining
of the essence of psychoanalysis than are the organizations that give rise
to them and to which in turn they report. On the contrary, I incline to
Bion's view that "the individual cannot help being a member of a group."
The odd thing is that the analyst, perhaps more than any other
professional -- particularly any other professional as dependent as
analysts are upon training, professional development and recognition,
referrals, etc. -- can see himself "in such a way as to give reality to the
idea that he does not belong to a group at all."

To understand this more fully, I believe, requires that we add to the
defensive importance of the pair in psychoanalytic organizations a better
understanding of some other anti-organizational aspects of
psychoanalytic tradition and culture. But before going on to address
that, I think we can see at this point more clearly how these dynamics of
analytic organizations contribute to the social defence of intolerance. On
the one hand, the very looseness of the felt tie to the organizational
systems of psychoanalysis, the primacy of the involvement in the pair,
generates greater ambivalence at best and resentment at worst about the
constraints of organizational life; the organization is seen more easily as
intrusive and becomes more readily the object of attack. At the same
time, as one's own organization or faction is still needed as a source of
recognition and support, other competing organizations or factions
become targets for that displaced resentment. Moreover, the very
sharpness and tightness of the boundaries which the organization sets
up defensively to protect itself from the ambivalence of its members,
creates a clear boundary across which it becomes easier to project
hostility and, of course, makes it more necessary that members find
outlets for their hostility elsewhere than in their analytic factions or
institutes.

Psychoanalytic Culture

There is, I think, a third set of factors embedded in generally
unacknowledged aspects of psychoanalytic culture, a culture that tends
to devalue the larger world to which it sees itself opposed and superior.
Analysts often view the institutional world of business and government
organizations, from which they have turned away in choosing this
profession, with wary detachment if not contempt. Individually, they
tend to adopt positions of superiority, even arrogance, towards those
who do the work of management, even those who do their own
administrative work. There is a certain privileged sense of immunity they feel from the ambition, envy, competition and turbulence of the world. Collectively, they tend to exempt themselves from scrutiny and judgement, justifying authoritarian and secretive policies by virtue of their deeper insights or greater responsibilities; on the other hand, they feel victimized by those same practices.

Such attitudes and values originated with Freud, I believe, and are sustained by identifications and idealizations of him. For many years, Freud has been seen as a contemporaryCopernicus, who shifted the center of the world, or Marx, who exposed the true basis of its ideals, or Einstein, who discovered its unifying principle. I don't mean to question the historic value of Freud's work, but I do mean to point out the impact of having such an heroic icon looming over the profession, an icon who described repeatedly his isolated opposition to the world. "I understood that from now onwards I was one of those who have disturbed the sleep of the world." (Freud, 1914) "I was completely isolated. In Vienna, I was shunned," he wrote of his early years. And later: "In Europe I felt as though I was despised." (Freud, 1925)

Freud's ambivalence towards the very institution he needed to establish as part of the world he scorned can be seen as the thread that runs through the early history of the psychoanalytic movement. In the early years he described his inward estrangement from the group he gathered around himself in Vienna: "I could not succeed in establishing among its members the friendly relations that ought to obtain between men who are all engaged upon the same difficult work; nor was I able to stifle the disputes about priority for which there were so many opportunities under these conditions of work in common." (Freud, 1914, p. 25) He suggests but does not embrace responsibility for what appears to be a bewildering curse. At another point he observed wearily, "to stir up contradiction and arouse bitterness is the inevitable fate of psychoanalysis." (p.8) And later, justifying the choice of Jung as his successor: "I saw that there was a long road ahead, and I felt oppressed by the thought that the duty of being a leader should fall to me so late in life." (p.43) He was 54 at this time, as Strachey notes.

His initial failure to establish Jung as his heir led to the creation of the Committee, "a band of brothers" (Grosskurth, 1991), as a means of controlling the burgeoning movement. At Freud's insistence, the Committee operated secretly, while the International Psychoanalytic Association and its Congresses presented a more official public face to the world. But this attempt at control behind the scenes failed to prevent a series of defections following upon the earlier losses of Adler and Jung:
Rank broke openly with Freud, Ferenczi was estranged at the time of his death, Jones built up a Kleinian faction in England.

Clearly Freud was well aware of the competition and hostility underlying such group arrangements. *Totem and Taboo* (1913) spells out clearly the problem of competition faced by the primal horde of brothers both among themselves and with the father. And it seems clear that the brother/sons of psychoanalysis understood as well (Roustang, 1982). What I think was not understood in this collusion between the analytic sons and their father to control the movement from behind the scenes was how they enacted together an arrogant rejection of the larger world. The attempts of the sons to pair with the father and to secure for themselves a privileged position relegated the institutions they created and managed -- the International as well as the local institutes -- to a secondary status. The father's manipulation of his sons kept at bay the world that scorned him and which he scorned in return.

The dissolution of "the Committee" roughly coincided with the establishment of training policies through the International. The 1925 Bad Homburg Congress set up a committee to recommend and oversee training procedures for analytic institutes. At the same historical moment, Freud withdrew from public participation in institutional affairs. For some time he had held no official post in any of the psychoanalytic organizations, leaving that to his sons; from this point on he ceased attending the Congresses. But the legacy had been established that would haunt the institutional life of psychoanalysis from then on: the true, uncompromising value of psychoanalysis was to be realized only on the "splendid isolation" (Freud, 1925, p. 22) of the analyst's lonely work; its institutional life was bound to be compromised, disappointing, corrupt, and successful only at the price of its own integrity. The message had been conveyed: Freud himself, the icon, had presided over only one failure after another in attempting to locate his contribution in the world.

This mythopoetic legacy derives additional force from the ways in which it resonates with actual practice. Psychoanalysis, of course, cultivates suspicion of avowed motives and self-reflection over action. It looks inward and backward, rather than outward and forward. Just as it seeks to uncover the illusions and fight the resistances of patients, it developed itself in opposition to prevailing institutions and social norms.

But the legacy of Freud's stance towards the world also resonates profoundly with important traditional practices and beliefs in psychoanalysis which at this point have become stereotypes of orthodoxy -- frequently more honored in the breach than actually observed, and
certainly subject to substantial modification if not revision in many areas, yet still immediately recognized as hallmarks of traditional psychoanalytic thinking.

In traditional theory, for example, human behavior is not seen as grounded in social experience but rather in biological drives, drives that in their conflictful unfolding, their "vicissitudes," determine even the fate of civilization. Psychic reality, derivative of the drives, is distinct from social reality. In effect, Freud seeks to stand on a conceptual ground that exempts it from the influence of social forces.

Moreover, traditional theory parallels the hiddeness of this reality with the hiddeness of the analyst. A "blank screen," the analyst is urged to become invisible and, as a corollary to this, is instructed to become neutralized of the feelings and assumptions that govern the transference-ridden life of his patients.

Following from this is the assumption that analysts should be able to withstand conflict and temptation better than others. The training analyst, for example, as we have seen, should be able to withstand the pressure of seeking to convert his candidate/patient to his own analytic beliefs or should be free from the feelings that might cloud his judgement in reporting on his progress.

Traditional theory holds itself to a rigorous and uncompromising standard of scientific truth; symptomatic relief, cure, happiness are viewed as secondary goals, by-products. Patients may come for therapy, but the analyst is above all a scientist whose prime interest is studying human behavior. He is not to be swayed by the patient's needs or wants.

These stereotypical ideas have been significantly modified if not altered by most psychoanalysts in recent years. But my point is that they are of a piece with what I am trying to identify as a psychoanalytic Weltanschauung that places the analyst, in his own mind, apart from the world within which he lives and works. And I think it is no surprise that along with modifications of these stereotypical ideas in recent years has come a growing chorus of criticism, within the field, for its smug aloofness and indifference to critical reflection.

Earlier I noted the criticism that has been voiced about training practices. More recently and more broadly, Orgel (1990) noted the tendency in the profession to idealize and gloss over the errors of earlier generations of psychoanalytic leaders, including Freud, and pointed out their frequent narcissism, arrogance, and dogmatism, their insistence that they are
above criticism, their aggressive behavior towards candidates, and their 
fomenting of dependent attachments.

At the same time, as Simon (1992) has recently noted, only lip-service is 
paid to true scientific aims: "Our canons for use of evidence are sloppy 
and inconsistently applied, our commitment to serious empirical testing 
is weak. We rarely present our failures for communal discussion -- we 
have no Journal of Failed Cases; only a few research-minded analysts are 
willing to survey the overall results of analytic treatment. We are prone 
to the undue influence of charismatic and persuasive leaders." (p. 966)

These criticisms from within the field derive in part certainly from the 
fact that psychoanalysis is under attack on many fronts, and no longer 
enjoys the privilege of its beleaguered past or more recent prosperous 
hegemony within the field of mental health. Masson (1990), a recent 
defector, writing with the vehemence of a disappointed convert, has 
aroused public controversy. But probably more important has been the 
challenges coming from biological psychiatry, academic psychology, 
changing reimbursement policies in health care, and competing methods 
of psychotherapy. The point here is that, under these pressures, 
psychoanalysis is beginning to acknowledge its position in and of the 
world. Its truths and methods no longer enjoy immunity.

But I think it is also time to acknowledge the role that this sense of 
privileged apartness has played in the history of psychoanalytic 
institutional life. It has made it possible for analysts to maintain a sense 
of detachment from their own institutions, as if those very institutions 
were necessary concessions to existence in the world. Following Freud, 
they have found it difficult to assume true collective responsibility for 
their own organizational needs. Thus matching the almost exclusive 
attention to pairing relationships within the field, analysts have shown 
indifference, detachment, and disdain towards their own institutional 
position in the world.

The primary targets of that disdain, I think, have been psychoanalytic 
leaders themselves: whoever has aspired to become a son of Freud, to 
assume the mantel of leadership, has I think, risked the subtle 
disparagement of their followers. If, as Orgel (1990) and Simon (1992) 
contend, psychoanalytic leadership has frequently been narcissistic, 
arrogant, and "overly-persuasive" and if, on the other hand, that kind of 
leadership has tended to be sheltered from overt criticism -- followers 
have allowed themselves to be overly persuaded -- one has to suspect the 
existence of a collusion. Leaders can lead, but the price of attempting to 
engage the world that Freud disdained and to create an organization that
Freud failed to succeed in establishing is that those leaders will fail to engage the respect and support they need to fully succeed at their tasks.

If narcissists are attracted to leadership positions in psychoanalysis, could that be because they are particularly vulnerable to be exploited in the service of this collusion: they will buy into the prominence these roles afford and not probe too deeply into the underlying meaning of the support they are given or question too deeply the value of the tasks they are assigned to perform?

What I am suggesting, in short, is that an additional dynamic source of the virulent schisms and splits that beset psychoanalytic organizations derives from the by-standers, the psychoanalytic membership, who derisively watch their leaders sully and contaminate themselves in their ill-fated efforts to succeed where Freud failed, at tasks that Freud disdained. From the position they have taken up in their minds of being apart from the world of social reality -- the world in which competition, compromise, and political conflict inevitably appear -- they project their fear and hatred of that world into the leaders who dare to engage it. They unconsciously promote the very schisms, which they also dread, because it confirms their sense that the world is a baffling, cruel and ultimately inferior place, a place where they do not belong.

Conclusions

This exploration of the tensions embedded in psychoanalytic identity, psychoanalytic organizations and psychoanalytic culture, I believe, accounts for the fragile nature of psychoanalytic institutions. When those institutions are subject to the stress of a particular conflict or controversy, threatening to alter the balance of on-going power relationships, the membership resorts to the defensive response of splitting and schism.

The social defense of intolerance -- which ultimately leads to splitting -- is, in effect, the final common pathway in which defenses against the contradictions of the analyst's identity, the internal tensions of analytic institutions, and the marginality of psychoanalytic culture in relation to the world join together to proffer an illusory security of sectarian life. Virtually the entire history of psychoanalysis has been bedeviled by accusations and counter-accusations of "orthodoxy" and other forms of religious fanaticism. I don't think, in fact, that psychoanalysis is a form of religion, but I do think this constant looming threat of "orthodoxy" speaks to the apprehension that analysts have always had of how easy it is -- almost how inevitable -- to establish closed boundaries around the
enterprise. In the task it sets itself of providing therapeutic interventions as well as in the task it faces of nurturing its own institutional development, psychoanalysis must be open to discovery and transformation through its encounters with reality; in that sense, it must be scientific (Kernberg, 1993). It is, on the other hand, constantly threatened by the danger of closed boundaries under the pressures I have attempted to point out; in that sense it is threatened -- and, I think, knows itself to be threatened -- by the danger of becoming a collection of cults.

In one way recent developments in psychoanalytic theory are helpful in lessening the underlying pressures I have been trying to describe. Increasingly, analysts seem to accept the multidimensional and indeterminate nature of reality; truth not only is seen as hypothetical but also contingent upon the particular stance of the agent who is seeking it. Thus the analyst increasingly accepts both the fact that an analysis is never concluded, the analysand is never conclusively analysed, but also that, in a sense, each analyst provides his own analytic opportunity, with a unique collection of potentials and limits. This is a view of analysis as "action research," to borrow a term from organizational work. To the extent that this version of the analytic enterprise can be internalized by the psychoanalyst -- made a part of training and valued as a part of analytic wisdom -- the pressure to identify and punish deviants may diminish.

Along the same lines, I think that the analytic culture I have attempted to describe is also changing. Social reality has crashed in upon the International and American Psychoanalytic Associations in the form of an anti-trust suit; moreover, under the pressure of increasing competition from other forms of psychotherapy, analysts are grasping both the need for greater collaboration and the need for leaders they can support.

Finally, though, there is something of a prescription implied in this vision of the vicissitudes of psychoanalytic institutions. Psychoanalysis can broaden the scope of its vision to include its own institutional life. That is, it has the potential to build into its institutional structures the study of its own organizational conflicts and covert processes.

At times, of course, particular and limited reforms in psychoanalytic training may be quite desireable for particular purposes. The introduction of different theoretical viewpoints into analytic curricula may help promote a greater acceptance of differences in analytic technique. The non-reporting by training analysts of the progress of candidates to training committees may be useful in making training analyses more authentic. Allowing candidates to select training analysts,
or even supervising analysts, from other institutes may further reduce anxiety and conformity and may, also, foster an ecumenical spirit. But, I think, any such reform can easily be subverted into serving an end quite different from that intended (see Slavin, 1993). The analogy with symptom relief in psychoanalysis itself comes to mind. One may succeed in changing the patient's behavior, but the persisting pressure of the underlying conflict will cause a different and perhaps more virulent symptom to emerge.

The conflicts and anxieties I have described are deeply embedded in the texture of the psychoanalytic enterprise. As I have tried to suggest, the defensive maneuvers they have given rise to have been exceptionally virulent forms of intolerance sanctioned in the institutional history of psychoanalysis by its leaders, starting with Freud. But the underlying tensions persist in the work; they are part of it. The identity of the analyst will always crave certainty, and analysts will always be tempted to shore up that certainty at the expense of colleagues who think differently; moreover, colleagues will always invite scorn by clinging to limited views and being intolerant in turn. The analytic pair will always separate out from the analytic group to do its work, and the group will always feel threatened by the power of those pairing bonds. Finally, I think, the analyst will always seek to remove himself from the world he would rather understand than change; those who work with the wounded, by and large, prefer not to be at the front lines.

I believe that the only way these issues can be addressed adequately in the long run is by our analytic institutions themselves taking up a self-reflective, analytic stance towards their own internal conflicts and defensive maneuvers. That is, the hidden, covert aspects of our institutional relatedness might be made available to us to reflect upon and to consider as we work together.

There is a tradition of group and organizational analysis that has grown up out of psychoanalysis. Freud (1921) began it, of course, but Bion (1959) contributed the essential clinical observations that made it useful. This paper is an outgrowth of that tradition, and I have referred to some of its concepts, especially the concept of "social defenses" (Jaques, 1955; Menzies, 1967). This tradition remains available to psychoanalysis to further its own organizational work. This would require, of course, dismantling some of our institutions more rigid and opaque boundaries, as Rickman (1951) suggested over forty years ago. That is no easy matter, of course, as it would lead to more overt criticism, competition, and vulnerability in leaders. But that may be the only real alternative we have to enduring our institutional shortcomings.
A beginning might be to bring knowledge of this tradition into our psychoanalytic institutions through courses for candidates in the psychodynamics of organizations. Some forms of "executive education" might be designed for senior analysts within particular institutes. Consultation is also available from those trained in this tradition for organizations facing particular dilemmas. A major step would the establishment of training programs for psychoanalytically oriented organizational consultation within analytic institutes.

It may sound implausible to think that our institutions would undertake self-analysis as a goal. But I do not think it is utopian to believe that they could bring about a greater tolerance for collaboration, given the fundamental vision of psychoanalysis as effecting transformation through insight.

Where brutalizing splitting was, there might organizational ego be.
References


